Strategic Mastery: Engineering and Logistics Expertise in Northern Europe during 1944
Engineering during World War 2 kept the punch the army's fist.
In last week’s edition of V for Victory, we discovered the art of reporting from the frontline, including how troops and reporters relied on the National Pigeon Service to send messages back home. In this week’s edition, we’ll dive in to the mechanical and logistical challenge of invading Normandy. Hundreds of books delve into the intricacies of the Second World War, yet the key elements of an effective military force remain a subject of diverse perspectives. Various experts, including military leaders and historians, contend that effective leadership stands as a fundamental factor in shaping a formidable military. That got me thinking.
Two years ago, Putin ordered his troops to invade Ukraine. Instead of a ‘lightning war’ Putin, along with the rest of the world watched vast columns of armour and logistics supplies grinding to a halt. At the time, I wrote several blogs on why the invasion had faltered, with the main reason being Russia’s inability to maintain its equipment in the field. During my military career, my colleagues and I spent more time maintaining equipment than we did soldiering. Anyone who has worked on an armoured vehicle will tell you how temperamental they are?
Now let’s consider equipment maintenance in World War 2. In October 1942, drawing in experience from the Royal Service Corps, the Royal Engineers, and the Royal Signals, the MoD established the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, known as REME. The role of the REME is to do exactly what it says on the tin, to fix electrical and mechanical problems.
Like the Royal Engineers, and Royal Signals, REME officers and soldiers served everywhere from the front lines, to rear echelons. Royal Navy mechanics stay with their ships. They become familiar with every dial, piston and wiring loom, unlike REME mechanics, who are assigned to a myriad of equipment. Unlike today’s modular vehicle components, British vehicles in the 1930s and 1940s had components made from a wide variety of civilian vehicle manufacturers. That decision would have serious consequences later in the war.
In consequence, the armed forces were obliged to service some 600 different models, which created chronic difficulties. Around Antwerp, Montgomery’s armies were obliged to for a time to commandeer thousands of horse-drawn wagons abandoned by the Wehrmacht, to make good of its shortage of vehicles. Max Hastings
In September 1943, General Montgomery’s armies lost 1,400 three-ton Austin trucks because of faulty pistons. The three-ton trucks carried everything from troops, food and water, to medical aid, fuel and other supplies needed to sustain the enormous allied army. By 1945, REME had 158,000 officers and men, almost three times the total size of today’s British Army.
An engine doesn’t run without fuel. In his book Armageddon, Max Hastings notes that on D-Day, the Allies shipped twenty two million fuel jerry cans (20 litres), and by September, half were missing. In addition, Hastings notes that American troops lost 1,200 small arms and 5,000 tyres per day. Imagine trying to justify those numbers to the tax payer.
Following the breakout of Normandy, elements of the US Third Army under General George S. Patton often covered more than 80 miles a week. While Patton’s army forced the German Army to retreat across France, it also caused serious supply problems for the push to Berlin. Brigadier General Ewart G. Plank oversaw a convoy system to carry rations, fuel, ammunition, and other vital supplies to troops at the front. The convoys became known as the Red Ball Express. Let it never be said that [a lack of supplies] stopped Patton when the Germans couldn’t, General Plank.
By late August 1944, the Red Ball Express had over 6,000 trucks. In 1944, there were no regulations regarding driver's hours, and Red Ball Express drivers typically operated in pairs, frequently enduring over 50 consecutive hours of driving to reach forward supply depots. Although it was deemed a success, Ewart’s plan could not have been achieved without command of the skies. By November, Red Ball’s drivers had delivered 412,000 tons of fuel, ammunition, and equipment to 28 different divisions.
We should also spare a thought for the thousands of civilians who worked tirelessly to manufacture the huge amounts of materiel to support not only the Allied invasion, but the equipment sent to the Soviets.
The concept of building empires finds expression in various aspects of life, and this holds true even in the context of World War II. The officer in charge of supply for the allied armies was General John C.H. Lee, an avid church attendee, became known as Jesus Christ Himself (his initials) and he wore three stars on the front of his helmet, and three on the back. General Eisenhower received criticism for failing to address Lee’s shortcomings.
While stationed in Great Britain, Lee demanded – and got – his own private train to avoid the clogged roadways of southern England. When Paris was liberated, he moved his command into the city taking over hundreds of the city’s best hotels. He was the senior officer that everyone – including the other senior officers – loved to hate. Military History Now.
The size and scale of maintaining the Allied advance in June 1944 was colossal. To put the cost of supply into context, in 2010, a Major from the Royal Logistics Corps informed me that Britain spent £10m a day on fuel needed to keep its ground and air fleet operational in Afghanistan.
Thinking back to the question raised earlier, the key to an effective fighting force is a well equipped one. Just imagine being on the frontline, running short of ammunition, food, water and suitable clothing. That’s exactly what Axis forces dealt with on the Eastern Front. How did that turn out?
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