Russia-Ukraine War: Russia retreats from Kherson but peace and prosperity is a distant memory
Russian forces scramble onto boats and ferries to escape across the Dnipro River
48 hours ago, Russia’s defence minister announced that Russian troops in the city of Kherson would withdraw. Many hard-line Russian’s would argue the withdrawal is embarrassing, but since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s military tactics have been exactly that, but why?
To understand why the Russian army is performing poorly, we must understand what makes a good military force. Discipline, motivation, respect for international law, air superiority and a robust command and control network are essential components for success. A tri-service (army, navy, air force) must compliment each other, and they must be able to work independently when required.
Russian doctrine is on focused on achieving a quantitative advantage in manpower, and absolute firepower superiority because of its large numbers of field artillery. At the tactical and operational level, the Russians are failing to get the most out of their manpower and materiel advantage. Stories of Russian troops drinking too much vodka and using insecure communications is all too common.
Sergey Shoygu’s vision for a ‘dynamic’ modern military hasn't to materialised. You can put the latest individual weapon system in anyone’s hand, but that does not mean they will be able to shoot straight, or be able to operate in the field as an effective force.
Since 2008, the Russian military has undertaken ambitious, “New Look” reforms to — among other things — replace or modernize 70 percent of its military equipment by 2020, increase the number of enlisted personnel, and overhaul the defense industrial base. Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu said in a speech that he believed these reforms and a series of presidential decrees also tied to the year 2020 would allow the Russian military to “reach a new qualitative level.” National Review
International support is also vital, except Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine brought about hefty global sanctions and condemnations from NATO and its allies.
The Kremlin’s decision to deploy troops on the border with Ukraine months before Putin’s Special Operation invasion was a mistake. Living in the field for weeks on end without the comforts of home erodes moral, especially during winter. Soldiers get bored, and ‘Exercising’ becomes monotonous after a few weeks.
By the time Moscow blew the whistle to invade, many of its troops would have felt the effects of living on field rations, sore feet, mouth ulcers and panzer rash, a term given by armoured crews when they bang their heads, trap fingers and bang shins on solid steel.
Broken down tanks and armour points to ineffective command and control, negligent equipment care and poor combat logistics. Morale collapses when troops aren’t fed, or they don’t receive, mail, ammunition or spares.
Maintenance of armoured vehicles takes discipline and skill
Operating armour requires an established preventative maintenance framework, which includes a tested method for 1st and 2nd line repairs on the battlefield. Crews carry out 1st line repairs, such as track maintenance, and other general tasks designed to keep an armoured vehicle moving. Typically, NATO crews undertake formal training on how to operate and maintain ‘armour’.
Dedicated engineers/technicians conduct 2nd line repairs, both mechanical and electrical. An army doesn’t march on it’s stomach, it marches on its feet, and a lack of qualified ‘boots-on-the-ground’ leads to a lack of equipment care.
An armoured vehicle requires love and attention by its crew. If a driver acts carelessly, the sheer torque created by the huge power plants will throw a track of its wheels. It can take an unmotivated crew hours to re-seat a track on its road wheels. Longer nights and shorter days can affect a crew’s ability to self-recover. A static tank is a sitting duck for precision munitions and it is expensive to replace.
The Eastern Front of World War 2 was synonymous for thick mud, bringing the most capable of tanks to a standstill. As winter draws in and the rain falls, both Ukrainian and Russian armour will struggle to manoeuvre on the plains of Eastern Europe.
Good practice is for tank crews is to conduct ‘Hot checks’ - after a short period of movement. Commanders will call a short halt, and crews will disembark to check oil levels, and torque random track pins to ensure battle readiness. When you consider the various reports of indiscipline by the Kremlin’s forces, ask yourself if Russia’s armoured crews will follow any of the basic guidelines described in this post?
“Due to low morale and reluctance to fight, Russian forces have probably started deploying ‘barrier troops’ or ‘blocking units’.” UK Intelligence, via Huffington Post
The Russian Battalion Tactical Groups capable of conducting deep raids, envelopments and flanking manoeuvres have not performed well on the rolling countryside. Operating in urban warfare is arguably the most dangerous environment for an infantry soldier to operate in.
Defenders have the advantage of surprise because they know the land, the streets, the houses and the cellars. Troops in defence can create ‘choke-points’ to draw in the enemy and create chaos and confusion by setting ambushes, using small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
The element of surprise should not be underestimated. Soviet troops suffered thousands of casualties during the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US and its allies also suffered many losses to IEDs.
Urban warfare is dangerous and costly
To understand what has happened in Kherson, we must look back through history. From Stalingrad to Mosul, history tells us that military operations in built-up areas is high risk, and comes at high-cost.
According to Britannica.com, during the battle for Stalingrad (1942-43), Axis casualties reached approximately 800,000, with the Soviet army losing around 1,100,000 soldiers. Thousands of civilians lost their lives in a war of attrition.
In recent times, Iraqi and US forces fought hard to liberate Mosul from Islamic State. The Mosul Study Group estimates the operation cost $2bn in damage to the city, and over 20,000 civilians were killed. When factions wage war in urban environments, there is little regard for human life or private property.
Urban environments elevate risks because of the complexity of the physical terrain, the presence of civilians, and the ecosystems of political, economic, and social networks. Civilian populations face food, water and medical security issues during heavy fighting in towns and cities. Subsequently, home nations must deal with mass displaced citizens.
Indirect fire (IDF) caused by artillery and motor fire causes damage, often on a mass scale. Hospitals, schools, religious buildings and residential areas become smouldering piles of rubble. Targeting industrial areas inhibits manufacturing, supply chains and poses severe environmental problems.
Operating at a tactical level requires high levels of trust from senior leaders that non-commissioned officers can lead under extreme pressure. The British Army exemplifies how a military force conducts itself at the lowest levels (8 soldiers or fewer, known as a section).
Mission command is given to corporals, known as section leaders. Simply, a British NCO will understand their mission and parameters and be expected to get on with the task. This is in contrast to Russian troops, who are often micromanaged and have little understanding of tactics needed to survive and defeat the enemy.
There is no surprise a poorly trained, ill-disciplined army has had notice to withdraw from Kherson. Ukrainian forces have dealt Russia with more than a bloody nose, and despite the Kremlin’s conscription strategy, things could get worse for Putin’s army.
Ukrainian forces must tread carefully on the streets of Kherson, because who knows what lies ahead for its liberators. It could be years before peace and order is restored to the city, and wider Ukraine. President Zelensky may feel encouraged by Russia’s retreat, but he must ensure his forces are prepared for a long period of attrition.